'The course of German history' by A.J.P. Taylor

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Hello Hivers and Book Clubbers,

I'm back with another review. We're staying in the realm of non-fiction, as is most often the case in my reading. The book in question is titled 'The course of German history', by British historian A.J.P. Taylor. Originally written in 1945 (guess why), it has seen multiple prints since then. I got this specific copy off the internet, which was released in 2001. The story itself numbers about 270 pages, so it's not too long a read. The style, though Taylor certainly is an academic, leans more towards the polemical and opinionated, which is good for the lay readers. In this review, I'll be mentioning my own views next to those of Taylor on some issues, since I feel quite comfortable with a lot of the subject matter. Let's get into it.

A German state?

Taylor talks in the introduction about an issue that I want to address here firstly: for how long has the German people (Volk) actually had a state (staat). Every beginner of European history will probably know the year 1871 is important: the unification of Germany under Bismarckian Prussia. And while this is certainly the start of the modern German state, can we go back further than that?

Taylor says 'yes' with certainty. And he points back to a very well-known man in history: Charlemagne. Francia is a complicated entity. Most often it is read as the precursor to France, but there is a very easy road to the start of the German state too. When Charlemagne becomes Emperor of the West in 800, does that crown go onto the French in later centuries? No, it goes to the Germans in the form of the Holy Roman Empire (of the German nation).

One thing that counts against the HRE as a true state is the fact that its central control is very limited for the majority of the Middle Ages. The territiorial princes, which numbered in the hundreds then, had a vast degree of autonomy. Yet, Taylor argues, the HRE gives the Germans some framework at least, and the idea of a common nationality and a common destiny with it.

I like this train of thought a lot; the idea that the German Nation has existed for over a millennium, even though the German State in its modern, liberal form only came into being late in the 19th century. The same can be said for Italy, for instance, but that is out of the scope of this story.

The failure of Liberalism

You cannot think of the modern Western world, for good and for ill, without liberal values based on the Enlightenment. These values were spread mostly through two Great Powers: England, through a gradual process, who spread it also to the United States. And then there's France, who did it through a violent revolution, overthrowing the old order in a relatively small timeframe.

One important note: liberalism, albeit in different ways, succeeded in gaining significant societal power. This is not the case for the Germans: the Habsburg Empire became a thoroughly reactionary affair in the 19th century: autocratic rule, no constitution, (mostly) no parliaments, no nationalism. Prussia, while more reformist, was also a militarized autocracy ruled by the landed class, known as the Junkers.

Taylor points out that liberalism did not come to Germany as an idea, and thus did not grow/germinate in a natural way in German lands. It was brought with fire and sword by Napoleon, during his successful central-European campaigns in the early 1800s. These gave liberal institutions to many West-German regions, among them the Rhineland. Think a common law, constitutions, etc.

From here, liberalism became popular among intellectuals and students, once again mostly in Western Germany. These people however, according to Taylor, expected power to fall into their lap somehow, like liberal legislation had fallen into their lap through French invasion.

Liberalism and nationalism were tightly wound together in those times, and the liberals were thus advocates of a single German state. This state would be far bigger than the Germany that you see on the map today: take the old (1871) German Empire, then add what is today Austria, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia, and you might approximate what they had in mind.

Power-Play

This so-called 'Greater Germany' never came into existence. It would have been the most powerful player on the European stage overnight, yet also a state riddled with issues. This liberal dream of a Greater Germany was opposed by both Austria and Prussia, for similar reasons.

Austria, as the 19th century went on, became a fading power, struggling to keep things together. The Habsburgs had been Holy Roman Emperors, and thus nominally rulers of Germany, for centuries, until the title was abolished (by Napoleon) in 1806. To rule Germany through a central state was like a wet dream to them, yet they no longer held the power to do so, and were anxious to defend what lands they still held (which, admittedly, were a lot). Denying the national principle was one of their big weapons in holding the entire realm afloat.

Prussia was a power on the rise, until Napoleon struck them hard. They only barely survived the Napoleonic Wars intact, and it took decades to return their Army to form, that which they relied on so heavily for their power and prestige. The Junkers were anxious to keep the character of the Prussian state (authoritarian, non-liberal, militarized) intact, and thought (rightly, in both Taylor and my view) that conquering Germany would alter the old balance on which Prussia was founded. That balance was already altered after 1815: the addition of the Rhineland to Prussia had brought in several million Catholic Germans, which was something that the Prussians had very little experience and/or sympathy with.

Both Austria and Prussia also realized that in order for them to gain the ascendancy in Germany, they would at some point have to do away with their rival. To form Greater Germany, Prussia would have to take all German-inhabited parts of the Habsburg realm, which would probably destroy it and leave Hungary as the biggest power in the Danube region. For Austria, it would require the full annexation and destruction of Prussia to do the same.

This is where the admittedly genius power-play of Bismarck enters the stage. His ability to make the best of international situations/crises was absolutely phenomenal, and his career from 1862 to 1871 as Chancellor of Prussia to the formation of Germany was wildly successful. Why? He found a half-way route that seemed to work: a form of 'Lesser Germany' that would found a strong German state, yet not upsed the status quo of Central Europe too abruptly.

He did this through two successful wars, both of which did not last very long, unlike both lost world wars. In 1866 he beat the Austrians, and thus Prussia became the foremost German state. All Austrian dependencies north of the river Main were annexed to Prussia. Those that were the allies of Prussia formed together the North German Federation.

France had remained neutral during this intra-German conflict, a baffling choice by Napoleon III that would cost him dearly. He would be the next target by Prussia, and would lose horribly in 1870. Napoleon III, who was captured in battle by the Prussians, did so badly that France almost directly reverted to the (second) Republic.

The Catholic German states below the river Main, (Baden, Wurttemberg, Bavaria largest among them) had joined Prussia in the war, and in 1871 joined as well into the German Empire.

This Empire, as a form of 'lesser Germany' did not include the millions of Germans living under the Habsburgs. Some would look longingly to their northern neighbour, a tendency that was repeated in 1938 with the Anschluss. In the end, German liberalism was not satisfied: this state was still authoritarian, and it was a compromized nationalism which did not include all Germans in one great State.

Conclusion

I picked two topics out of this dense, info-filled book, and already underestimated the amount of words I would need for them to make a somewhat readable story. It's just that interesting a read. Taylor's grasp on Central European history was phenomenal. I might review more books of his in the future (I have, in total, about 10 of his books). The second review in 3 days. I won't keep up this tempo, that's absolutely certain. The next review will probably be on South African history, another favourite topic of mine. Hope you've enjoyed reading. Until then,

-Pieter Nijmeijer

(Top image: blurry self-made photo of book cover)