This is a great improvement, sorely needed, as far as it goes. I reckon these additional points require inclusion.
First, each stakeholder has equity in the DHF proportional to their stake. As they vote for proposals that pass, the reduction of the DHF should deplete their VP to vote on new proposals. VP depletion causes profligate spending to reduce the power of profligate spenders and increases the relative power of the prudent in consideration of future proposals. In the event (unlikely as it may be) that there is growth of the DHF, that growth can be reckoned to proportionately increase VP concurrent with growth in the DHF, so prudent investment of DHF funds is reflected in VP of those that vote for performant proposals.
Second, without GAAP there is no accountability, no ability to measure performance, and no means of detecting fraud. With GAAP prudent DHF proposals that grow the DHF can be accounted to the credit of stakeholders that voted for those proposals, and increase their VP proportionately to their prudence increasing the value of Hive/DHF.
Third, instead of one Return proposal that must be overcome to fund anything, each proposal should have it's own Return proposal, so that expending small amounts of funds for worthy uses does not have to overcome the same resistance that spending the whole of the DHF does. A proposal to spend 2k HBD should not have to attract the same amount of attention necessary to a proposal to spend 2M HBD, which is the current situation. Finally, by requiring GAAP, a mechanism to measure the success of proposals at increasing investment in Hive becomes available, which can inform future proposals.
Because there are credible allegations of fraud facilitated by the complete absence of accounting standards for DHF proposals presently, I encourage everyone to vote the Return proposal until and unless proposals are required to use GAAP and are held accountable for performance. Without that the DHF proposal system is practically begging for fraud and criminal prosecution that can potentially destroy Hive itself.
Thanks!
Equity proportional to stake means no consensus is necessary to draw to your own account. While it would be entirely "fair" it would reduce the purpose of the DHF just self voting. The proposal covers this by giving everybody full weight on votes upto the funding amount, so a consensus is still required to spend.
Unless the proposal is just kicking back to the whales voting for it, there's no 'self voting' for DHF proposals. Reducing the VP of voters proportional to their votes for passing proposals reflects the reality of their equity in the DHF, and further incentivizes prudence, and prevents profligacy.
We need a system that doesn't just work in practice, but also in edge cases. If it doesn't work on old chain then it's a problem here too.
I like the thought of having different return levels for different proposals (like a threshold for proposals under 100, 500, 1000, 5000 etc) I'll have to mull on that as well.
I really like the idea too!
Upon reflection, that's probably preferable than just enabling DV's.
Good news... That's very nearly what this proposal does, and a little smoother so it can't be gamed as easily. The ladder is from daily inflow ~$1500 a day down to ~4500 a day(depending on price).
There might be lower totals, for instance enabling single expenditures of as little as may be desirable for superable purposes. Sometimes it's the little things that count.